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This article furthers our understanding of the ontology of modern international relations by 
foregrounding the neglected structuring role of nationalism. Most accounts of nationalism in 
international relations reduce the phenomenon to a peripheral threat, whereby nationalism 
only seems to become relevant in moments when the international order is in crisis. In 
contrast, I argue that the ontology of modern international relations is inherently parasitic on 
nationalism. Leveraging on Jacques Derrida’s writings on “hauntology,” this article recasts 
nationalism as a spectral logic that silently structures the ontology of modern international 
relations even when it seems to remain absent and ineffective. In particular, I explain how the 
contradictions of nationalism become embedded in the concept of sovereignty, which serves 
as the ontological cornerstone of modern international relations. Transgressions of 
sovereignty are therefore not reducible to a tension between normative and factual levels, or 
logics of appropriateness and logics of consequences, but stem from the structural 
impossibility of the nationalist project itself. Viewed this way, the aporetic form of 
sovereignty is not merely a logical conundrum, but a vital and productive ontological opening 
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1 
Spectra of Sovereignty: Nationalism and International Relations 
 
 
A spectre is haunting sovereignty—the spectre of nationalism… 
Sovereignty is the ontological cornerstone of modern international relations in both 
theory and practice.1 It is unsurprising, therefore, that IR scholars have produced a substantial 
corpus of theoretical literature on the topic (e.g. Bartelson 1995, 2014; Biersteker and Weber 
1996a; Kalmo and Skinner 2010; Krasner 1999; Walker 1993; Weber 1994). At the same 
time, however, there is also a marked tendency among these scholars to resign themselves to 
the inscrutability of sovereignty. Many have reached the conclusion that sovereignty is an 
essentially contested concept that can never be properly defined (e.g. Bartelson 1995, 13-6; 
Walker 1993, 166; Weber 1994, 9; see also Kalmo and Skinner 2010). Others have pointed to 
an irreconcilable tension between sovereignty as a legal or normative principle and 
sovereignty as an empirical fact (e.g. Koskenniemi 2006; Krasner 1999). All in all, the 
prognosis is rather bleak: “the question of sovereignty, viewed as a practical political 
problem, is an intrinsically paradoxical problem that can never be named, rationally 
deliberated, and solved” (Ashley and Walker 1990b, 375). 
The objective of this paper is not to “solve” the problem of sovereignty. To the contrary, 
the analysis largely corroborates the consensus among critical IR scholars that sovereignty 
marks the site of an insoluble aporia. Instead, the contribution of this paper lies in elucidating 
the historical and structural reasons for the existence of this aporia. This is done by 
foregrounding the neglected link between sovereignty and nationalism, and by tracing the 
inscrutability of sovereignty to the structural impossibility of the nationalist project itself: the 
impossibility of the nationalist project perpetually “haunts” the ontology of modern 
international relations, inscribing its own aporetic structure upon the concept of sovereignty. 
By closely scrutinising this logic of haunting, it becomes possible to comprehend how the 
concept of sovereignty works without having to “solve” its insoluble contradictions. In fact, I 
argue that it is precisely the aporetic quality of sovereignty that makes international relations 
work, by requiring an endless negotiation and renegotiation of the border line between the 
domestic and the international. Viewed this way, sovereignty is not merely the site of an 
                                                 
1 Throughout this article, “international relations” (lower case) is used as a general term that encompasses both 
the academic discipline and the arena of practice that is its object of analysis, while “International Relations” or 
“IR” (upper case) is used specifically with reference to the academic discipline. 
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insoluble problem, but a vital and productive ontological opening that sets international 
relations in motion. 
The marginalisation of nationalism in international relations has been accomplished 
through a double move. On the one hand, the nation is depicted as equivalent to the state: 
there is a widespread tendency to “collapse the nation into the state by conveniently assuming 
that the former is supervened by the latter” (Berenskoetter 2014, 263; see also Agnew 1994; 
Mandelbaum 2013). This is manifest in routine references to “national interests” and “national 
security” by scholars and practitioners alike. At the extreme, it has been suggested that 
“international relations” is an unfortunate misnomer for a field that would be better called 
“interstate relations” (Connor 1978, 383). Even those IR scholars who take culture and 
identity seriously tend to posit a congruence of “national identity” and “state identity” and use 
these terms more or less interchangeably (see e.g. Doty 1996; Kowert 1998; Lebow 2016; 
Subotić and Zarakol 2012). 
On the other hand, in the relatively few cases where nationalism is discussed explicitly, 
the nation is depicted as antagonistic to the state. For example, J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce 
Cronin (1994, 108) contend that modern nationalism entails a “historical tension” between 
“state sovereignty” and “national sovereignty.” In a similar vein, the international law scholar 
Martti Koskenniemi (1994, 249-51) contrasts “classical” and “romantic” conceptions of self-
determination, defining the former in state-centric and the latter in nation-centric terms. The 
most thorough exploration of the role of nationalism in international relations by an IR 
scholar, James Mayall’s Nationalism and International Society, makes the same 
dichotomising move: in Mayall’s (1990, 35-6) account, the modern international order was 
forged through an “ideological confrontation” between the conflicting principles of state 
sovereignty and national self-determination. In this framing, nationalism is reduced to an 
external threat which occasionally disrupts the habitual practice of international relations, and 
which disappears once a new compromise between state sovereignty and national self-
determination is found. 
Taken together, this double move transforms international relations into interstate 
relations and banishes nationalism to the peripheries of the international order. To explain this 
counterintuitive marginalisation of nationalism by a field which, after all, derives its name 
from the nation, I draw inspiration from Jacques Derrida’s writings on “hauntology.” In 
contrast to ontology, which is concerned with being and becoming, hauntology also 
encompasses the paradoxical “effectivity” of that which “seems to remain ineffective, virtual, 
insubstantial” (Derrida 1994, 10). The defining motif of hauntology is thus the figure of the 
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ghost or spectre, “which is neither present nor absent, neither dead nor alive” (Davis 2005, 
373). The essence of spectrality is precisely the aporetic mediation between presence and 
absence. And yet, even as it resists the binary choice between presence and absence, 
hauntology does not replace ontological theorising with vague approximations or a simplistic 
empiricism of difference in degree. Instead, it entails the elaboration of a different kind of 
“logic” that supersedes classical binary logic (Derrida 1988, 116-9). This deviant logic, which 
Derrida (1994, 10-1) describes as a “logic of haunting,” is able to comprehend not only the 
structural reasons for which ontologisation always runs into certain limits, but also the 
spectres animating the conceptual paradoxes that inevitably result from these limits—in this 
case, the paradox of sovereignty. 
The constitution of any ontology requires a “conjuration” of spectrality (Derrida 1994, 
161). This conjuration is twofold: on the one hand, it entails the exorcism of spirits or the 
disavowal of something that is present; on the other, it entails the calling forth of spirits or the 
summoning of something that is absent (Derrida 1994, 40-8). In this contradictory spirit, I 
argue that the ontology of international relations is constituted through a conjuration of 
nationalism. On the one hand, due to the fact that it poses a terrifying ontological threat to 
international order through irredentism and secession, the spectre of nationalism must be 
exorcised for the ontology of international relations to cohere—hence why nationalism only 
seems to make an appearance at times when the international order is in crisis. On the other 
hand, nationalism must also be continually summoned for international relations to be 
intelligible: without the figure of the nation, references to national interests, national security, 
national identity, or even the “international” would be nonsensical. Any eruption of 
nationalism on the international stage is merely the materialisation of a spectre that is always-
already at work. 
The motif of spectrality must be sharply distinguished from the standard depiction of 
the nation as an “imagined community” (Anderson 2006). Typically, the nation as an 
“imagined community” acquires effectivity only when the nation is imagined to exist, to be 
present, in the present: the act of imagination is about bringing into presence the national 
community. In contrast, the nation as a spectre acquires effectivity precisely when it seems to 
be absent: the spectre makes itself felt even as it fails to materialise. Accordingly, as regards 
existing literature on nationalism, it is Michael Billig’s notion of “banal nationalism” that 
comes closest to approximating the motif of spectrality, given that this refers to the “invisible” 
nationalism of established nation-states. In particular, Billig’s (1995, 38) depiction of the 
“forgotten reminding” of nationhood resonates with the paradoxical present/absent status of 
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the spectre: the banal “flaggings” of the nation are so ubiquitous that they “operate 
mindlessly, rather than mindfully. The remembering, not being experienced as remembering, 
is, in effect, forgotten.” 
Leveraging on Billig’s seminal work, a number studies have explored the variegated 
ways in which nationalism becomes sedimented in the “everyday” of national life (e.g. 
Edensor 2002; Skey and Antonsich 2017). However, these works generally remain confined 
to the domestic sphere and ignore the more universal structuring role of nationalism 
internationally. As one commentator notes, scholarship on nationalism has been characterised 
by “an almost exclusive focus on its subjective and discursive contours, especially the internal 
heterogeneity and difference that nationalisms seek to subsume and contain” (Goswami 2002, 
773). To some extent, then, this paper can be read as an effort to transpose the framework 
provided by “banal nationalism” to the international realm. In so doing, the paper extends and 
deepens existing critiques of “methodological nationalism” in the social and political sciences 
(Chernilo 2006; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). As Angharad Closs Stephens (2013, 29) 
has emphasised, “the argument about ‘methodological nationalism’ rarely goes far enough.” 
Even cosmopolitan and globalist attempts to transcend the framework of nation-states 
frequently contain a “residual” nationalism insofar as they posit an either/or choice between 
nationalism on the one hand and cosmopolitanism or globalism on the other (Closs Stephens 
2013, 111-4). However, whereas Closs Stephens is primarily concerned with developing the 
lens of “urban encounters” as an alternative way of imagining community, this paper has a 
rather different objective: to explain, in a systematic fashion, the structural relationship 
between sovereignty, nationalism, and international relations. 
To undertake this task, it is essential to recognise a shift in the register of nationalism as 
it enters the international stage: a shift from a particular to a universal register. This follows 
logically from the dual structure of nationalist discourse, which is characterised by the linkage 
of particular ethno-cultural contents to the universal form of the modern state: “The 
circulation of particular nationalist models cannot be understood apart from the structural 
constitution of the nation form as transposable within the modern inter-state system.” 
(Goswami 2002, 783). In short, nationalism becomes formalised and objectified as it enters 
the international stage. This differs from the banalisation or sedimentation of nationalism in 
the domestic sphere insofar as it is not merely the contents of a particular nationalism, but the 
universal form of nationalism itself, that is embedded in the ontology of modern international 
relations. As a result, the focus of analysis must shift from the everyday practices that 
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(re)produce particular national identities to the quasi-transcendental conceptual structures that 
enter into the constitution of all national identities—most notably, the concept of sovereignty. 
The remainder of this paper is organised into four sections and a conclusion. The first 
section reviews existing understandings of sovereignty in IR and demonstrates the systematic 
neglect of nationalism in these literatures. The second section outlines the historical 
emergence of the modern territorial state and argues that the modern state suffers from an 
inherent condition of ontological insecurity which requires the concept of the nation as a 
supplement. The third section is concerned with the contradictory logic of nationalism that 
emerges from the interplay of nation and state: nationalism not only underpins the ontological 
security of the state, but also threatens this security by legitimating irredentist and secessionist 
claims. The fourth section explains how the aporetic logic of nationalism forms the ontology 
of modern international relations, depositing its own internal contradictions onto the concept 
of sovereignty in the process. Transgressions of sovereignty in international relations are 
therefore not reducible to a tension between normative and factual levels, or logics of 
appropriateness and logics of consequences, but stem from the structural contradictions of the 
nationalist project itself. The concluding section sketches out some of the implications of the 
analysis with regard to the fate of state sovereignty in a globalising world. 
The Concept of Sovereignty in International Relations 
Sovereignty and statehood are so closely intertwined in modern international relations as to be 
almost inseparable (cf. Hoffman 1997). Thus, it is “sovereignty” that distinguishes a single 
federal state from a confederation of multiple states (Onuf 1991, 423). More specifically, 
sovereignty has both an internal and an external component: internally it means that “there is 
a final and absolute authority in the political community,” and externally it means that “no 
final and absolute authority exists elsewhere” (Hinsley 1986, 1; see also Brown 2014, 52-4; 
Bull 1977, 8-9; Jackson 1990, 26-31; James 1986, 50-7). By extension, the concept of 
sovereignty also implies a relationship of formal equality among states: “None is entitled to 
command; none is required to obey.” (Waltz 1979, 88). 
As poststructuralist scholars such as Richard K. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker have 
demonstrated, this Janus-faced concept of sovereignty—facing both inward and outward—is 
the ontological cornerstone of modern international relations (e.g. Ashley 1988, 1989; Ashley 
and Walker 1990a, 1990b; Walker 1993). It is the presence of sovereignty that defines the 
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domestic space as orderly and peaceful, and correspondingly, it is the absence of sovereignty 
that defines the international realm as anarchic and war-prone. This basic distinction between 
the inside and the outside of the sovereign state is upheld through a series of mutually 
reinforcing binary oppositions: peace/war, order/disorder, progress/stasis, and so on. In each 
pair, the first term is privileged while the second is depicted as a dangerous degeneration 
thereof. 
Perhaps the most eloquent discussion of sovereignty along these lines can be found in 
Jens Bartelson’s Genealogy of Sovereignty. Leveraging on Derrida’s work, Bartelson (1995, 
49-52) suggests that sovereignty functions akin to a “parergon” that frames a work of art—for 
instance, the frame of a painting. The parergon is not an intrinsic feature of the object, but “a 
frame, a line of demarcation, an ontological divide” that makes it possible to distinguish the 
object from its background in the first place. Accordingly, sovereignty qua parergon resides 
neither inside nor outside the state, but is the condition of possibility of both: “there is a 
ceaseless activity of framing, but the frame itself is never present, since it is itself unframed” 
(Bartelson 1995, 51). Sovereignty, then, is nothing but the difference between the inside and 
the outside; it has no “essence.” 
This conceptualisation of sovereignty as a parergonal frame is evocative but incomplete. 
Without a doubt, the ideal parergon would be devoid of any content of its own so that it does 
not detract attention away from the work of art that it frames: “in its purity, it ought to remain 
colorless, deprived of all empirical sensory materiality” (Derrida 1987, 64). However, a 
minimal degradation of the parergon is inevitable: even as it melts into the background in 
relation to the foreground and into the foreground in relation to the background, the parergon 
must also be distinguishable from both. In the end, all parerga “have a thickness, a surface 
which separates them not only […] from the integral inside, from the body proper of the 
ergon, but also from the outside, from the wall on which the painting is hung” (Derrida 1987, 
60-1). This “thickness” of the parergon is easily overlooked because it does not stand out, 
does not draw attention to itself, but instead “disappears, buries itself, effaces itself, melts 
away at the moment it deploys its greatest energy” (Derrida 1987, 61). In short, the 
“thickness” of the parergon is a “spectral” object: it is most effective precisely when it seems 
to be absent. 
By idealising sovereignty as a perfect parergon, as a pure divide between the inside and 
the outside of the state, poststructuralist IR scholars have limited themselves to questions of 
ontology at the expense of hauntology—how the concept of sovereignty shapes the world, 
rather than how the concept of sovereignty itself is shaped. To quote Cynthia Weber (1994, 
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3), the central question of the poststructuralist research agenda on sovereignty has been, “how 
do practices of theorists and diplomats stabilize the meaning of sovereignty and, by default, 
write the state?” The focus is thus placed squarely on the social construction of the 
inside/outside dichotomy, which requires “a great deal of hard work on the part of 
statespersons, diplomats, and intellectuals” (Biersteker and Weber 1996b, 3). In the same 
vein, Bartelson’s recent work on sovereignty as “symbolic form,” while extending the 
discussion to encompass the impact of global governance mechanisms, remains concerned 
with how sovereignty “not only structures our perception of political reality, but also allows 
us to shape objects in rough conformity with this form” (Bartelson 2014, 15). What this 
exclusive focus on the “external” ontological structuring effects of sovereignty has left out is 
the “internal” hauntological structuring of the concept of sovereignty itself. To be clear, the 
hauntological “inside” of the parergon is not the same as its ontological inside: the latter is 
simply the domestic society, whereas the former refers to a spectre that breaches the 
inside/outside distinction from “within” the slash. 
For poststructuralist theorists, the neglect of the hauntological dimension is largely self-
inflicted, stemming from the second of two theoretical moves that they make. The first move 
is to decentre the field by migrating to its “margins” or “border lines” (e.g. Ashley 1989; 
Ashley and Walker 1990a, 1990b). The starting point of poststructuralist IR is thus “a 
boundary that it puts in question: the boundary between domestic and international politics” 
(Ashley 1989, 260). Another name for this boundary is, of course, sovereignty. It is at this 
stage that these scholars make their second and more problematic theoretical move: in order 
to destabilise the inside/outside opposition, they deliberately place sovereignty “under 
erasure” (Ashley and Walker 1990b, 377; Weber 1994, 9). When it comes to understanding 
the role of nationalism in international relations, this second move proves fatal because in 
erasing sovereignty it also erases the spectral logic that structures sovereignty from “within.” 
In sum, if sovereignty is indeed a parergonal frame or a symbolic form, it is necessary to 
understand what this frame is made of, or what this form is formed of—it is necessary to 
understand sovereignty itself as a product. In referring to sovereignty as a “product,” I do not 
simply mean the practices of statecraft that (re)produce sovereignty as a parergonal frame, but 
the semi-autonomous hauntological labour that takes place “within” the frame itself, “within” 
the slash that separates the inside and the outside: the parergon “creaks and cracks, breaks 
down and dislocates even as it cooperates in the production of the product, overflows it and is 
deduc(t)ed from it. It never lets itself be simply imposed.” (Derrida 1987, 75). Sovereignty, 
then, is always-already structured by a silent spectral logic that belongs neither to the inside 
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nor to the outside, but breaches the parergon from “within.” It is this logic of haunting, herein 
strategically nicknamed “nationalism,” that gives sovereignty its Janus-faced modern form—
nationalism refers to the formation of sovereignty’s form. Accordingly, in contrast to 
mainstream IR which has generally ignored nationalism by taking sovereignty for granted, 
and poststructuralist IR which has (perhaps unwittingly) placed nationalism under erasure, 
this paper intends to take nationalism very seriously indeed. 
The Modernity of the State 
Nietzsche (1976, 453) famously remarked, “only that which has no history is definable.” 
Accordingly, given the difficulties that scholars have had in defining sovereignty, a historical 
approach to the problem seems most appropriate. Specifically, it must be recognised that the 
concept of sovereignty is not a transcendental given, but a particular feature of modern 
political discourse: “it is modernity’s career to which the concept of sovereignty has been 
ineluctably tied” (Onuf 1991, 425). The concept of sovereignty can therefore only be properly 
understood by considering its formation in the historical-structural transformations that 
marked the onset of modernity, particularly the emergence of the modern territorial state. 
In stark contrast to the modern world of nation-states, the socio-political landscape of 
pre-modern Europe comprised a patchwork of lord-vassal relations with overlapping religious 
and political jurisdictions. There was no clear distinction between domestic and international 
or public and private (Osiander 2001; Ruggie 1993). Pre-modern “society,” insofar as this 
term is even applicable, was one of ranks or orders, characterised by hierarchical relations and 
mediated access. A peasant, for example, owed allegiance to a lord, who in turn owed 
allegiance to the king: “one belonged to this society via belonging to some component of it” 
(Taylor 1999, 224). The copious divisions and sub-divisions of this socio-political mosaic 
were held together by the notion of a divine chain of being (Bauman 1992, 681). In other 
words, the medieval conception of human community was fundamentally universalistic: 
linguistic and regional differences were subsumed under a universal Christian norm which 
transcended its component parts. The earthly community was taken as an expression of a 
heavenly transcendental order, with the monarch as the half-human, half-divine link between 
the two (Bartelson 1995, 91-2; Osiander 2001, 127-36). The existence of a plurality of 
political communities was ascribed to the will of God (Seth 1995, 44). 
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The reigning consensus among scholars is that the modern world was forged over the 
course of the long nineteenth century (e.g. Bayly 2004; Buzan and Lawson 2015; 
Osterhammel 2014). This entailed a radical transformation of the hegemonic socio-political 
imaginary “from hierarchical, mediated-access societies to horizontal, direct-access societies” 
(Taylor 1999, 224). The centrepiece of the new order was an abstract conception of 
citizenship, which posited a direct and homogeneous relationship between the state and its 
citizens. Although detailed accounts vary, the key historical processes included the emergence 
of standardised public spheres courtesy of “print-capitalism” (Anderson 2006), the 
consolidation of territorially defined bureaucratic polities that sought to cultivate 
heterogeneous “low cultures” into homogeneous “high cultures” (Gellner 1983), and the 
development of market economies wherein participants were seen to enter into contractual 
relations on an equal footing (Taylor 1999, 224-5). These developments were not wholly 
endogenous to Europe, but took place in a global context wherein colonial encounters with a 
plurality of “others” catalysed a fundamental rethinking of socio-political order (Anghie 2005; 
Branch 2012). The pre-modern universal conception of human community gradually gave 
way to an emphasis on local particularity: the “vantage point from which human affairs could 
be contemplated” was “literally brought down to earth” (Bartelson 2009, 107). This 
secularisation of space and time in turn entailed a new understanding of history as something 
which was makeable by men and which “no longer required recourse to God or nature” 
(Koselleck 2004, 196; see also Fasolt 2004, 19-20). The pre-modern assumption of an always-
already-existing God-given order was replaced by an assumption of natural contingency 
(Bauman 1991, 4-5). 
Order in modernity is provided by the sovereign state. Whereas the so-called “feudal 
state” had been built around personal ties of obedience, the modern state is a territorially-
defined impersonal entity with standardised legal codes (Spruyt 2002, 129-35; see also 
Skinner 1989). As the ultimate guarantor of order and justice in modernity, the state basically 
has the function of a secularised and historicised God—to paraphrase Hegel, the state is the 
“Divine Idea on Earth” (as cited in Wight 2004, 269). However, abstract concepts such as 
order and justice are seldom sufficient to unite citizens, as this would reduce the state to a 
mere mutual-benefit society without affective ties (Parekh 1990, 254-5; Seth 1995, 48-50). 
More fundamentally, such universal principles are incapable of legitimating the existence of 
any particular state: there exists an ineradicable tension between the universal values that the 
modern state claims to embody and the inescapable geographical and historical particularity 
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of any individual state. This, in a nutshell, is what Istvan Hont (1994) calls the “permanent 
crisis” of the territorial state. And this is why the state must turn (in)to the nation. 
The Undecidability of the Nation 
Due to the contradiction between its claim to universality and its inherently particularistic 
existence, the modern state requires “supplementary work” (see Derrida 1987, 56). This 
supplementary work consists of the reification of “society” and its projection as “an alternate 
place” that can serve as “the ultimate source of legitimacy for the state” (Wæver 1993, 19). 
Whereas medieval rulers were seen to reside within a universal society that existed 
independent of them, modern society is seen to exist only within the state (Osiander 2001, 
141). The state/society distinction is therefore not symmetrical, but society exists only insofar 
as it is doubled or re-presented in the structure of the state: the state conceals the inherent 
inconsistency of society by re-presenting it in its own image and thereby retroactively positing 
society as a unified totality (Badiou 2005, 97-115; Weber 1994, 7-8). Put differently, society 
is a symptom of the state: without a state to “domesticate” it, the sphere of the social would be 
nothing more than an “infinite play of differences” (Laclau 1990, 91). The distinction between 
state and society is therefore not an external difference between two separate objects, but “a 
line drawn internally within the network of institutional mechanisms through which a social 
and political order is maintained” (Mitchell 1991, 78). 
Nationalism arises precisely from this uniquely modern distinction between state and 
society: the core principle of nationalism is that each society is a unique nation and that each 
nation should be as independent as possible (Breuilly 1993, 2; Gellner 1983, 1). In this way, 
nationalism seeks to “ground” the abstract concept of the state in a particular ethno-cultural 
community or nation (Parekh 1995, 34). Critics of this “modernist” thesis have argued, with 
some justification, that national identities and nationalist language predate the emergence of 
the modern state (e.g. Hastings 1997; Hirschi 2012). However, the crucial point is that “there 
was a remarkable time lag between the creation of nationalist language and the 
implementation of nationalist politics. By the end of the fifteenth century, the concept of the 
nation was almost fully developed in scholarly literature, whereas in political practice, 
imperialist, dynastic and religious principles would prevail for another three centuries.” 
(Hirschi 2012, 3; see also Hastings 1997, 3-4). It is only after nationalist language makes the 
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passage from scholarly literature to political practice that it becomes possible to talk about 
nationalism in the modern sense of this term. 
The watershed moment was the French Revolution, which “redefined the nation from a 
diffuse sentiment to a specific program for political and constitutional action” (Sewell 2004, 
96; see also Bukovansky 1999).2 This reconfiguration of the nation was epitomised by the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 1789, which proclaimed that “the 
source of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation” (as cited in Connor 1978, 382). The 
modern nation form that was thus forged in the furnace of the French Revolution turned out to 
be highly modular and was rapidly mimicked around the world (Anderson 2006; Goswami 
2002). As a result, nationalism has managed to establish itself as the hegemonic discourse of 
state legitimacy: “today no state possesses legitimacy which does not also claim to represent 
the will of the ‘nation’, even where there is as yet patently no nation for it to represent” 
(Smith 1992, 62; see also Connor 1981). 
However, due to its linkage of the state to a particular nation, nationalism not only 
legitimates the state, but always-already-also threatens this legitimacy by undermining the 
state’s claim to embody “universal goals of rationality, objectivity, progress, and 
development” (Subotić and Zarakol 2012, 918). By breaching the universality of the state, 
nationalism ensures that the identity and borders of the state are always open to contestation, 
opening the door to irredentist and secessionist claims (Brubaker 1998, 278-80; Mayall 1990, 
57-63). This ontological threat is inescapable because the ethno-cultural community that the 
state claims to represent is not pre-given, but a symptom of the state itself. Every self-styled 
nation-state is haunted by national minorities.3 The state must therefore engage in a never-
ending process of “writing” the nation, of inscribing the nation into society even as it posits 
this nation as its pre-given foundation: “the political unity of the nation consists in a continual 
displacement of its irredeemably plural modern space” (Bhabha 1990, 300; see also Weber 
1994, 27-8). There is thus a kind of “mutual haunting” of nation and state, where each calls 
upon the other to supplement itself without the two ever being fully reconciled (Cheah 2003, 
307-47). Due to this mutual entanglement, nationalism is not only a terrifying menace to the 
integrity of the state, but also the surest protection against this menace. 
                                                 
2 It is noteworthy that two key terms were first recorded in the context of the French Revolution: “international” 
was coined in 1789 by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (Der Derian 1989, 3) and “nationalism” was 
coined in 1798 by the exiled French priest Jacques Barruel (De Bertier De Sauvigny 1970, 155). 
3 In a fascinating article on the conceptualisation of “spectral” legal personality in interwar international law, 
Natasha Wheatley (2017, 758) notes that national minorities were “likened to slaves and ghosts.” 
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Reflecting this tension, the word “nation” has acquired a dual meaning, signifying a 
state as well as a particular ethno-cultural community. This is not simply a terminological 
muddle (cf. Barrington 1997; Connor 1978), but a structural effect of what Slavoj Žižek has 
called the “parallax gap.” The parallax gap refers to a situation where there are “two closely 
linked perspectives between which no neutral common ground is possible” (Žižek 2009, 4). 
To be clear, this does not entail a relativist claim where an object merely appears different 
when viewed from two different perspectives. Instead, the critical feature of the parallax gap 
is that there is in fact no object apart from the difference in its framing: “in contrast to a mere 
difference between objects, the pure difference is itself an object” (Žižek 2009, 18). Viewed 
this way, the nation can be conceptualised as the pure difference between state and society: 
the nation does not indicate a presence, but a constitutive gap at the heart of the modern socio-
political edifice. By simultaneously connecting and separating state and society, the concept 
of the nation achieves “an impossible short circuit of levels which, for structural reasons, can 
never meet” (Žižek 2009, 3). As John Breuilly (1993, 62) observes, “Nationalist ideology 
never makes a rational connection between the cultural and the political concept of the nation 
because no such connection is possible.” 
The nation as the pure difference between state and society belongs to the category of 
“undecidables” (Bauman 1991, 58-9). The notion of undecidability must be clearly 
distinguished from the notion of contestability that has been widely deployed in constructivist 
approaches to nations and nationalism (e.g. Brubaker 1998, 279-80; Calhoun 1997, 98-9). 
Simply put, constructivist approaches take communities such as nations to be socio-political 
“projects” that must be continually (re)produced through discursive practices: nations “are not 
things in the world, but perspectives on the world” (Brubaker 2004, 17). An understanding of 
the nation as undecidable does not contradict this argument, but instead adds a further twist: 
although the nation is indeed not a “thing in the world,” it is not wholly reducible to a set of 
discursive practices either. Without the existence of a quasi-transcendental concept of the 
nation, it would not be possible to distinguish a nation from any other type of community: the 
spectral figure of the nation—together with its connotations of sovereignty, territoriality, and 
so on—necessarily enters into the constitution of all particular national identities. 
In contrast to the basically empirical argument implied by the notion of contestability, 
the notion of undecidability implies a logical or structural argument: the nation as undecidable 
is not mere “indeterminacy,” but “a determinate oscillation” between state and society 
(Derrida 1988, 148). If the fundamental objective of the nationalist project is the congruence 
of state and society, then the nation as the difference between state and society is the object 
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that opens up the space for this project in the first place. By implication, however, the nation 
is also the object that stands in the way of this project: for the nationalist project to be 
completed, for state and society to be congruent, the nation as the difference between state 
and society must be effaced. In other words, the nationalist project is “an effect which exists 
only in order to efface the causes of its existence” (Žižek 2008, 100). The problem, however, 
is that if the difference between state and society were to be effaced, then the primordial lack 
at the core of the modern state would be revealed—or not revealed, which is the same thing 
for a lack (Derrida 1987, 59-60). To avoid this terrible crisis, the nation must never be 
completely effaced and the completion of the nationalist project must always be deferred. The 
nation is thus not only the condition of possibility, but also the condition of impossibility, of 
the nationalist project.4 
The Hypocrisy of Sovereignty 
To comprehend the significance of nationalism’s aporetic logic for international relations, it is 
necessary to recognise that, akin to sovereignty, the concept of the nation has an internal and 
an external dimension (Kowert 1998; Todorov 1993, 171-6). On the one hand, in its internal 
dimension, the concept of the nation invokes the aforementioned relationship between state 
and society: “The nation is a space of legitimation, and as a source of power it is opposed to 
kingly or divine right.” (Todorov 1993, 175). On the other hand, in its external dimension, the 
concept of the nation invokes a boundary with other nations: “No nation imagines itself 
coterminous with mankind.” (Anderson 2006, 7; see also Triandafyllidou 1998). In other 
words, the state/society opposition is accompanied by an inside/outside opposition. And given 
that another name for the inside/outside opposition in international relations is “sovereignty,” 
it is the relationship between these two oppositions that is the key to understanding the 
structural link between nationalism and sovereignty in international relations. 
The state/society and inside/outside pairings relate to one another through the spectral 
play of nationalism. This paranormal activity cannot be properly grasped through any 
metaphysical concepts, but it is helpful to think about it metaphorically as a ceaseless activity 
                                                 
4 In Lacanian terms, the idealised congruency of the nation-state “can be read as a fantasy, or a fantasmatic 
project, an endless endeavour of overcoming the lack and contingency of social life by offering a ‘fullness-to-
come’” (Mandelbaum 2016, 248). In this framing, the concept of the nation corresponds to the object-cause of 
desire or what Lacan calls objet petit a (see Žižek 2009, 17-20). 
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of folding and unfolding (Figure 1).5 This folding and unfolding takes place along a crease, 
along the slash that separates the two terms in each paring. As we already know, the crease 
between the inside and the outside is called sovereignty and the crease between state and 
society is called the nation. The crucial point here is that these are in fact two sides of the 
same fold: sovereignty is the nation turned inside-out. As nationalism folds state and society 
into one another, it effaces the difference between them and constructs an internally congruent 
nation-state. A clear distinction between the inside and the outside is thereby established: the 
internal boundary between state and society is turned into an external boundary between 
nation-states. Given that the inside/outside dichotomy is the ontological cornerstone of 
modern international relations, it is precisely through this activity of folding, which quite 
literally turns the state/society distinction inside-out, that nationalism enters the international 
stage. However, the folding of state and society into one another is always-already interrupted 
by the spectral figure of the nation, which must never be completely effaced: state and society 
may be folded toward one another, but they can never fully merge. The fantasy of the 
congruent nation-state must therefore remain just that—a fantasy (Mandelbaum 2016). And, 
by implication, sovereignty too must remain a fantasy. 
International relations are, both literally and figuratively, the unfolding of the nationalist 
project. Accordingly, in testimony to the fantasmatic quality of sovereignty, effectively all IR 
theories recognise some kind of transgression of the inside/outside dichotomy. Classic 
examples include complex interdependence and institutional cooperation in neoliberal 
approaches (e.g. Keohane and Nye 1977) and the uneven distribution of capabilities in 
structural realism (e.g. Waltz 1979). More recently, there is a growing body of scholarship on 
sovereign inequalities and hierarchies in international relations (e.g. Donnelly 2009; Hobson 
and Sharman 2005; Lake 2009; Zarakol 2017a). The one insight that all of these divergent 
approaches share, more or less explicitly, is that states are never fully their own masters. A 
state’s sovereignty depends on its ability to maintain internal order and external 
independence, but “activities pursued by sovereigns to maintain the well-being and safety of 
the community necessarily include actions that overlap and potentially infringe upon the 
sovereignty of other communities” (Piirimäe 2010, 66). The formal principle of state 
sovereignty is therefore inevitably tainted with more “substantive” factors such as military 
strength, diplomatic tact, and popular loyalty (Hoffman 1997, 14-5). And as a corollary, both 
                                                 
5 Perhaps the most accurate way to conceptualise nationalism is as a process of eversion that turns a structure 
inside-out, but this is quite difficult to visualise. The visualisation of sphere eversion has been discussed at some 
length in the field of Mathematics (e.g. Francis and Sullivan 2004). 
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statehood (Clapham 1998) and sovereignty (Berg and Kuusk 2010) would seem to be relative 
rather than absolute concepts. 
However, sovereignty is also, by definition, an absolute category: “There can be no ‘sort 
of’ sovereign, any more than there can be a ‘sort of’ God” (Brown 2014, 50). Most 
commonly, scholars have resolved this tension between the conceptual absoluteness and the 
empirical variability of sovereignty by distinguishing between “normative” and “factual” 
levels: “On the one hand, states assert the right to supremacy over authorities within their 
territory and population and independence of authorities outside it; but, on the other hand, 
they also actually exercise, in varying degrees, such supremacy and independence in 
practice.” (Bull 1977, 8, emphasis added). In a similar vein, Stephen Krasner (1999) 
distinguishes between “logics of appropriateness” and “logics of consequences” as motivators 
of state behaviour and claims that it is the primacy of the latter over the former that explains 
the prevalence of “organized hypocrisy” in international relations: states pay lip service to the 
sovereignty principle while happily violating it in practice. This tension between norms and 
power politics is analogous to the distinction made by international lawyers between 
sovereignty as law and sovereignty as fact (see e.g. Koskenniemi 2006). A similar dichotomy 
between “the concept of sovereignty and the political realities to which it supposedly refers” 
also underpins Jens Bartelson’s (2014, 30-1) theorisation of sovereignty as an “ideal form” 
that empirical reality can only approximate. All in all, the standard solution can be 
summarised as follows: all states are sovereign in principle, yet no state is fully sovereign in 
practice. 
There are two interrelated problems with this solution. First, the distinction between 
normative and factual levels constructs an empirical “outside” as an alibi for sovereignty, 
allowing the concept to retain its purity even as it is continually violated in practice. In other 
words, the identification of empirical transgressions of sovereignty actually contributes to the 
(re)production and (re)stabilisation of the concept: the fact that a transgression has occurred is 
taken to prove the fact that there exists a sovereignty principle that can be transgressed 
(Weber 1994). The second problem is that the concept of anarchy, sovereignty’s opposite 
number, is saddled with a double role. On the one hand, international anarchy is a necessary 
condition of state sovereignty insofar as the latter is predicated on the absence of a higher 
power. On the other hand, precisely because there exists no higher power to guarantee 
adherence to sovereignty norms, it is the condition of international anarchy that is seen to 
engender the violation of state sovereignty in practice: “the international system is an 
environment in which the logics of consequences dominate the logics of appropriateness” 
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(Krasner 1999, 6). In short, international anarchy is required to explain both the possibility 
and impossibility of state sovereignty. 
The ascription these contradictory effects to anarchy belies the extent to which this 
concept “derives from and reproduces the political project of the nation-state” (Zarakol 
2017b, 266). When scrutinised, the concept of anarchy does not actually explain anything 
unless it is combined with other variables, in which case it is these other variables that do the 
explanatory work (Donnelly 2015, 412-3). Even in the absence of an international 
government, the international realm can be ordered and governed in a myriad of ways (Milner 
1991; Wendt 1992). In the end, the only thing that the concept of anarchy tells us is that there 
exists a lack—an “absence of government” (Donnelly 2015, 407-12). 
The crucial point is that the lack symbolised by anarchy is the same lack that undercuts 
the ontological security of the modern state from within. Modern statecraft is precisely about 
externalising this internal lack, of externalising the problem of difference by locating the 
“other” beyond the boundaries of the state, so as to represent the domestic realm as a 
congruent social totality (Ashley 1989; Blaney and Inayatullah 2000). In other words, as the 
state/society distinction is turned inside-out by the play of nationalism, the subjective lack on 
the inside of the state is externalised into an objective lack on the outside. In this way, the 
play of nationalism not only underpins the legitimacy of the state, but also forms the 
international stage on which states can be recognised as independent actors. More 
specifically, it is the impossibility of the nationalist project that forms this international 
community of nation-states. As Jean-Luc Nancy (1991, xxxix) tells us, community is 
constructed through a “subtraction” of work that is not done: “it is the work that the 
community does not do and that it is not that forms community.” Equally, it is the unfinished 
work of the nationalist project, the indefinite deferral of its own self-completion, that forms 
the international community: the international community is nothing but the exposition of the 
finitude and mortality of the modern state.6 
It is with the formation of the international community that sovereignty acquires its 
external or international component: any claim to external sovereignty presupposes the 
existence of an international community of states that recognise the inside/outside distinction 
as valid (Werner and De Wilde 2001, 288). Accordingly, whereas the roots of internal 
sovereignty qua supreme authority can be traced back to Roman times, the external 
                                                 
6 In Lacanian terms, the formation of the international community can be read as the “mirror stage” of 
nationalism: it is on the international stage, face-to-face with other nation-states, that the subjectivity of the 
nation-state “is rendered both meaningful and incomplete” (Mandelbaum 2016, 249). 
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component of sovereignty only became thinkable with the gradual development of a particular 
form of international politics, centred on the idea of the territorial state, in early modern 
Europe (Thompson 2006, 253; see also Costa López et al. 2018; Hinsley 1986). The Janus-
faced form of sovereignty is thus a historically contingent consequence of its “nationalisation” 
from the early modern period onward: the concept of sovereignty does not, in and of itself, 
presuppose the existence of other sovereigns, and the idea of a global sovereign is by no 
means conceptually incoherent. In contrast, the concept of the nation is inherently particular 
and necessarily implies the existence of other nations (Abizadeh 2005, 49-50). 
The splitting of state sovereignty into an internal and an external component is 
necessitated by the same primordial contradiction that gives rise to nationalism: the 
contradiction between the state’s claim to universality and its inherently particularistic 
existence. In the domestic realm, this unsolvable problem is “solved” by the concept of the 
nation, which functions as the undecidable link between the universality of the state and the 
particularity of the society that the state claims to represent. In the international realm, the 
splitting of sovereignty effects a similar “solution” by positing that sovereignty is universal 
internally but particular externally. This move does not abolish the underlying contradiction, 
but provides it with a form in which it has “room to move” (see Markell 2003, 109-11). In 
other words, the play of nationalism does not and cannot produce a seamless ontology, but 
leaves a structurally necessary crease in the fabric of the modern international order—a split 
within the concept of sovereignty itself. This split serves as a kind of metaphorical 
gravestone, designating the haunted site where the undead body of the nation has been buried: 
it is on the border lines of the international order that nationalism “lives on” (see Derrida 
1979). 
Conclusion: The Autodeconstruction of Sovereignty 
The central argument of this paper has been that the paradoxes of sovereignty in international 
relations can be traced to the impossibility of the nationalist project. By extension, given that 
the nationalist project itself emerges out of the need to supplement the ontological insecurity 
of the modern state, “The problem of sovereignty is the problem of the state itself.” (Hoffman 
1997, 19). More specifically, the supplementation of the state entails the formation of two 
impossible-yet-necessary concepts: the concept of the nation and the concept of sovereignty. 
Given that these two concepts are merely two different projections of the same internal lack 
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that plagues the modern state, the structure and function of sovereignty in the international 
realm mirror the structure and function of the nation in the domestic realm: both concepts are 
split between the universal and the particular, providing the contradictions of the modern state 
with a form in which they have “room to move.” And it is precisely in the room of movement 
provided by sovereignty’s aporetic form, in the ethereal non-place between the inside and the 
outside, that international relations “take place.” The aporetic form of sovereignty is therefore 
not merely a logical conundrum, but a vital and productive ontological opening that sets 
international relations in motion: by inscribing its own impossibility upon the concept of 
sovereignty, the spectre of nationalism makes international relations work. In the end, the 
phrase “international relations” may not be a misnomer after all. 
By way of conclusion, I will sketch out some of the implications of this analysis with 
regard to the claim that globalisation is bringing about the separation of sovereignty and 
statehood (e.g. Brown 2014; Sassen 1996). This claim is also implicit in the growing tendency 
to supplement sovereignty with adjectives such as “relational,” “shared,” “suspended,” 
“divisible,” and “post-statist” (Camilleri 2008, 33-4). The specific point that I want to 
emphasise here is that the uncoupling of sovereignty from the state is not reducible to those 
empirical developments that are often grouped together under the name “globalisation.” This 
is because, as I have argued, the notion of a territorially-bounded sovereign state has always 
been fantasy. At most, “globalization has merely further complicated an already complex 
relationship between sovereignty and territory” (Agnew 2018, 2; see also Shah 2012). 
Consequently, drawing a sharp contrast between the age of globalisation and the age of the 
nation-state actually “reintroduces a methodologically nationalistic conceptualization of the 
nation-state in spite of itself” (Chernilo 2006, 13; see also Closs Stephens 2013). Instead of 
being depicted as a radical break, globalisation should be understood as a metaphor for the 
autodeconstruction of sovereignty.7 This process of autodeconstruction is not instigated by 
any external force, but by a spectre that resides within sovereignty itself—the spectre of 
nationalism. 
The spectral figure of the nation is “the ghost of the undecidable” that deconstructs 
sovereignty from within (see Derrida 1992, 24-5). It does so, quite simply, by bestowing the 
concept of sovereignty with an external component. At first glance, this would seem to be a 
                                                 
7 As a metaphor for deconstruction, “globalisation” must be understood as a concrete process rather than an 
abstract totalising gesture. For this reason, both Derrida (2002) and Nancy (2007) prefer the French word 
mondialisation. The etymological roots of “globe” in the Latin globus or “ball” imply a self-contained totality, 
whereas the origins of monde in the Latin mundus or “world” have a more concrete socio-cultural tonality (Li 
2007, 142). 
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simple addition to its internal counterpart, even a logical corollary thereof. In the words of 
Alan James (1986, 50), sovereignty “has two aspects each of them reflecting, in different 
ways, central elements of a unitary sovereign statehood.” Upon closer scrutiny, however, it 
becomes clear that the external component radically undercuts the absoluteness of sovereignty 
by making it conditional upon international recognition and thereby inaugurating the tension 
between sovereignty as an empirical fact and sovereignty as a legal or normative principle. As 
a result, sovereignty is always-already escaping the orbit of the state. Jens Bartelson (2014, 
87) has described this as the “governmentalization” of sovereignty, whereby “responsibility 
for its maintenance has been wrested out of the hands of domestic governments and delegated 
to a thousand petty emperors acting on behalf of an imagined international community.” In an 
insightful passage, he points out that this entails an inversion of the traditional inside/outside 
dichotomy: warfare and violence come to be associated with domestic politics, paralleled by a 
linkage of the international realm with peace and prosperity (Bartelson 2014, 97-104). Simply 
put, the locus of sovereignty shifts from the state to the international community: insofar as it 
is the international community that has the power to confer sovereign status to political 
entities and acts as the guarantor of order, it is the international community that is sovereign. 
All in all, the external component of sovereignty is not simply an addition to, but can 
also substitute for, its internal counterpart. Hence, for example, the possibility of “quasi-
states” that “lack many of the marks and merits of empirical statehood” (Jackson 1990, 1). In 
turn, the possibility of detaching the internal and external components from one another 
decisively undercuts the doctrine of the indivisibility of sovereignty, paving the way for a 
more thorough disaggregation of the concept (see e.g. Bartelson 2014, 74-90; Krasner 1999, 
3-42; Lake 2009, 45-62). And if sovereignty can be disaggregated and divided up among 
different actors to different degrees, then it cannot be an absolute category—sovereignty must 
be a spectrum.8 This spectrality of sovereignty is reducible neither to empirical differences 
between states, nor to the development of global governance mechanisms, but is inscribed 
into the very structure of the concept by the spectral logic of nationalism. By lodging itself 
between the internal and external components of sovereignty, the ghostly figure of the nation 
breaches the concept of sovereignty before any empirical transgression can occur. 
                                                 
8 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word “spectrum” can refer to an apparition or phantom as well 
as a range or continuum. Both “spectre” and “spectrum” are derived from the Latin spectrum (plural, spectra), 
meaning appearance, image, or apparition. 
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